Remarks in the Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime
Immanuel Kant’s
Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen
über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen
(Remarks in the Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime)
At
present, this translation is being made free of charge on the web. It is
based on Marie Rischmueller’s German edition of Kant’s Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen
über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner
Verlag, 1991). Throughout, I have included both references to page
numbers in both Rischmueller {marked with an R} and in the Academy Edition of
Kant’s works [marked with square brackets]. The Academy Edition version
is volume 20 of the Academy Edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Vol
20, Ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co: 1942), available
on the web at http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/dt/forsch/kant/aa20/.
Kant’s text Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime is
available (in German) in volume 2 of the Academy Edition and at http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/dt/forsch/kant/verzeichnisse-gesamt.html.
The text has been translated into English as Observations on the Feeling of
the Beautiful and Sublime (trans. John T. Goldthwait, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1960) and in a forthcoming translation by Paul
Guyer that will be part of the Anthropology, History, Pedagogy volume in
the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Notations
such as “{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}” give Rischmueller’s
notation (1), followed by an explanation of where in the original Observations
the relevant Remark occurs (on the back side of the cover), followed by the
Academy edition page number of that original page.
Throughout,
struck out text (like this) is text that Kant struck out (based on
Rischmueller’s notation). Words that appear in <wedge brackets> are
words that Kant inserted into his previously written remarks. The Academy Edition does not include struck
out material and does not note insertions as such.
Throughout,
there are three sorts of notes. Notes marked with asterisks (* or **) are
Kant’s own footnotes. Notes in Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3 . . .) give
either the original term being translated here or note variations between
Rischmueller’s text and the Academy editions. Roman numerals (i, ii, iii,
. . .) give explanatory information. These notes are still quite rough; I
hope to refine them soon.
I
strongly welcome any comments or criticism of this translation. The
current translation is a working draft, but it will be published in the near
future. Please send comments to frierspr@whitman.edu
or Patrick Frierson, Philosophy Department,
{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}
{R 7} [3]
The man’s art of appearing inconsiderate and the woman’s of appearing prudent.
A person can employ two
kinds of beneficial emotions on others, respect and love, the former by way of
the sublime, the latter by way of the beautiful. A woman reconciles both. Never does a
This composite sentiment is the
greatest that can ever affect the human heart.
Yet, it [the heart] can only be strong enough for two faint sensations. Should one of the two be strong, then the
other must be weak. One now wonders
which of the two one wants to weaken. Principles
are of the greatest sublimity. For
example, self-esteem demands sacrifice.
E.g. a man can be ugly but a witty woman cannot.
The Coquette exceeds the feminine, the rough
Pedant the masculine; a prude is too masculine and a petit maitre[i]
too feminine
It is ridiculous that
a man, through understanding and a large income, wants to make a young woman
fall in love with him
The diversity of women
as that of faces. Characters
Parallels between feeling and capacity
A more tender (dull) a
finer (coarser) taste[1]
<Sympathy with the natural misfortune of
others is not necessary, but it certainly is for the injustices suffered by
others.>
[4] The feeling with
which I am dealing is so constituted that I do not need to be taught to ratiocinate
in order to feel it
{R 8} The finer feeling
is that for wherein is contained what is idealistic <not chimerically the
noble ground> of agreeableness
Voltaire knew and I hope
<why women are embarrassed among one another>
dolce
piccante the
pleasant harshness[ii]
Bold <The audacious
gulp Alexander took from the chalice
was sublime though rash>[iii]
The splendor of the
rainbow of the setting sun
Cato’s
death.[iv] Sacrifice <Our current constitution makes
it so that women can also live without men, which ruins everything>
strange and
peculiar
the powerful person is kind. Jonathan
Wild.[v]
The brave youngster.
[5] Women are strong[2]
because they are weak <their courage>
Menfolk will be casual
toward vapeurs and hysterical coincidences[vii]
Hat under the arm[viii]
Love and respect
<Taking revenge oneself[3]
is sublime. Certain vices are
sublime. Assassination is cowardly and
low. Most do not even have the courage
for great vices.>
Sexual love always
presupposes lustful love,[4]
either in sensation or memory.
This lustful love is
also either crude or refined
{R9}Tender love has a
great mixture of respect, etc.
A woman does not
reveal herself easily; for this reason she does not drink. Because she is weak, she is clever
In marriage unity not union
Tender love is also
different from marital love
{2, Title Page, Front Side, Upper Margin}
- - {Latin} What you
desire is in you
nor should you inquire
outside [of yourself] Persius[ix]
On moral rebirth
What supplies a true
or imagined need is useful good for me[5]
{Title Page, Under “Observations”}
The desires that are
necessary for a person through his nature [6] are natural desires. The person
who has no other appetites and none to a higher degree than through natural
necessity is called the person of nature and his satisfaction
ability to be satisfied by less is the sufficiency of nature
The first part of
science is zetetic, the other dogmatic[x]
The number of
cognitions and other perfections required for the satisfaction of nature is the
simplicity of nature. The person in {R10}
which one encounters as much simplicity as the sufficiency of nature is the person
of nature.
Whosoever has learned
to desire more than what is necessary through nature is luxurious.
The needs of the person
of nature are pressing
needs
A reason why the representation
of death does not have the effect that it could is because as active creatures
by nature, we should hardly think about it at all
{3, reverse side of title page}
Gaiety is wanton, irritating, and
disruptive; but the soul at peace is benevolent and kind.
Wit[6]
belongs to unnecessary things; a man who takes this to be essential in a woman
acts just like one who spends his fortune by buying parrots and monkeys
One of the reasons why
debauchery among the female sex while in an unmarried state is reprehensible is
because of the fact that [7] when men in this state are debauched they are not
thereby preparing themselves for infidelity in marriage, for their [men’s]
concupiscence has certainly increased but their capacity has decreased. On the other hand, with a woman the desire is
unrestrained if the concupiscence increases.
So nothing holds one back from presuming that loose women will become
unfaithful, but the same is not the case for similar men.
Every purpose of
science is either eruditiv (memory)
or Speculation (reason).[7] Both must result in making a person more
reasonable (cleverer, wiser) and thus more sufficient in a world that is
generally suitable to human nature.
{R11}A tender
woman-love has the characteristic of developing other moral characteristics,
but the lustful ones suppress them.
<Moral taste is
such that one regards science that does not improve as unimportant>
The sensitive soul at
peace is the greatest perfection in speech, in poetry, [and in] society, but it
cannot always be so. Rather, it is the final
goal – even so in marriages. Young
people surely have much sentiment but little taste; the enthusiastic or zealous
style ruins taste. Perverted taste
through novels and gallant flirtations.
The healthy, pampered, [and] spoiled taste.
A knowledgeable but not clever man [is]
not cunning
a clever but not wise man. Higher manners
[8] The woman has a
fine taste in the choice of that which can affect the sensations of a man and
the man has a dull [taste]. Therefore,
it pleases him most when he thinks least about pleasing. On the other hand, the woman has a dull healthy
taste for that which is concerned with her own sensations
{4, sheet inserted after the title page, front side}
Bearded women
beardless men. Valiant domestic.
The honor of a man
consists in the valuation of his self, of women in the judgment of others. A man marries according to his judgment, a
woman not against the judgment of the parents.
A woman opposes injustice with tears, a man with anger.[8]
went so
far sometimes puts one of Seneca’s judgments in a
woman’s mouth and makes it “as my brother says.” Were she married it would be called “as my
husband tells me.”[xi]
Men become sweet
toward women if the women become masculine.
Insult to women in the habit of flattering them. {R12} Softness roots out more virtue than
wantonness, the dignity of a housewife.[9]
The vanity of women
makes it so that they are only happy in the glimmer beyond the home
The bravery of a woman
consists of the patient bearing of ills for the sake of honor or love. That of a man in the eagerness to defiantly
drive it [ill] away.
[9] Omphale forced Hercules
to spin[xii]
Because so many
foolish needs make us soft, the pure unaffected moral drive cannot give us
enough powers. Therefore, it must come
to something fantastic.
Whence the stoic says:
my friend is sick; what does it matter to me
There is no man who
does not feel the heavy yoke of opinion, and no one does away with it.[10]
The chimera of
friendship in our condition and the fantastical friendship in the ancient condition. Aristotle[xiii]
Cervantes
would have done better if instead of making the fantastical and novelistic[11]
passion ridiculous he had made something better of it. Novels[12]
make noble women fantastical and common ones absurd.[xiv]
noble men also
fantastic, common ones lazy[13]
Rousseau’s book serves
to improve the Ancients
In accordance with the
simplicity of nature, a woman cannot do much good without the providing of a
man. In conditions of inequality and
wealth, she can [do so] immediately
Moral luxury.[14] In sentiments that are without effect
Inner grief about the
inability to help, or about the sacrifice when one helps, even when one’s own
cowardice makes us {R13} believe that others suffer much although they can reasonably
endure it, brings about pity.
Incidentally this is a great [10] antidote against selfishness. These drives are altogether very cold in natural
persons.
The natural elevations
are degradations in one’s state, for example to raise oneself to the position
of craftsman
Relative evaluation is
quite unnecessary, but in the state of inequality and injustice, it is good to
set oneself against the pompous high-ups with a certain pride or at the least
indifference so as to disapprove of unimportant things
With a certain breadth
one must [breaks off]
{5, back side, opposite page 1 in
Although being tall
does not make a man great, physical greatness does indeed conform to moral judgments
It is easier to educate
a nobleman than an [ordinary] person. He
would be a despiser of the common rabble.
For he must call them the industrious and the oppressed so that one
believes he has been created to support him.
The scholars in
In all states there is
no one more useless than a scholar as long as it is in natural simplicity; and
no one more necessary than the same in a state of oppression by means of
suspicion or force
Thoughtfulnesses belong to small and pretty
dispositions
A woman’s affects are just as large as a man’s,
but they are superior, especially when it comes to respectability, the man is
rash. The Chinese and Indians have
affects that are just as great [11] as Europeans but they are calmer. A woman is vengeful
The rising sun is just
as splendid as the setting sun, but the {R14} sight of the former strikes the
beautiful, the latter the tragic and sublime
What a woman does in marriage comes much more from natural bliss than
what the man does, at least in our civilized condition
Because so many
unnatural desires find themselves in the civilized conditions, the occasion for
virtue also sometimes originates, and science originates because so much luxury
is found in enjoyment and knowledge. In
a natural condition one can be good without virtue and reasonable without
science
It is now difficult to
have insight into whether a person would have it better in simple conditions 1.
because he has lost his feeling for simple gratification. 2. because he commonly believes that the
corruption that exists in a civilized state also exists in conditions of simplicity.
{6, page 1 of
[12] Bliss without
taste is based on innocence and modesty of inclination. With taste it [is based on] the sensitive
soul at peace; for this reason it is possible for one to be happy without
society. Amusements, not needs. Rest after work is pleasant One must never chase after gratification.
{Lower margin}
One must distinguish “he
is in accordance with the taste of others” from “he has taste in consideration of
the judgments of others.” Women know very
well how to evaluate in accordance with the taste of others, and for this
reason easily know other minds and have good taste to satisfy them. But they have a bad taste for others, which
is good. For this reason they also all
marry the richest
{7, page 2 of
{R15}Tenderness and fondness
of sensation.
Taste chooses in
trifles
{8, sheet inserted after
Logical egoism [is] <skillfulness in taking a
stance.>
Common duties do not need
as their motive the hope of another life, but greater sacrifice and self-denial
surely have an inner beauty. But our
feeling of pleasure for them can never be so strong in itself that it outweighs
the annoyance of inconvenience unless the representation of a future state in which
the persistence of such moral beauty and the bliss is thereby increased, so
that one will find himself more capable of acting, thus it [the representation
of a future life] comes in handy.
All pleasures and
pains are either physical or ideal. As
for the latter [breaks off]
[13] A woman is offended
<by crudeness> or oppressed by injustice where no justification
but only threat can help. She uses her
touching weapons of melancholic tears, reluctance, and complaints, but she
endures the ill anyway before she ever returns the injustice. See here the courage of woman. The man gets angry that one might be so bold so
as to offend him; he returns force with force threatens,
frightens, and lets the insulter feel the consequences of his injustice. See here the courage of man. It is not necessary that the man be indignant
about the ill of delusion; he can despise it in a masculine way. Yet he will be as truly infuriated about this
ill as about true insults if it befalls a woman.
{R16}A woman never
uses scolding reproaches as the external weapon of her anger against a woman,
but rather against a man, except by means of the threats against another man
When men
women squabble or fight the men laugh about it, but not the other way around
Duels primarily have
their basis in nature for the sake of women.
[14] In the present
condition, a man can use no other means against injustice than a woman can,
that is, authority is arranged not in accordance with the order of nature, but rather
with the civil society
constitution
Rousseau. He proceeds synthetically and starts from the
natural person, I proceed analytically and start from the civilized person
The
country life delights everyone, especially the shepherd’s life. Indeed, [the country life] absorbs the civilized
person’s boredom.
{9, back side, opposite
The human heart may be
constituted as it wants, so the question is simply whether the state of nature
or of ethical
civilization develops more actual sin and skill in it [the heart]. It can subdue moral ill so much that merely a
lack of great purity appears in action but never a noticeable degree of
positive vice (whoever is not so saintly is for that reason not vicious). On the other hand, this can develop so far
that it becomes detestable. The simple
person has little temptation to become vicious.
[15] Luxury alone accounts for great provocations, and the culture of
moral sentiments and understanding will never hold itself back if the taste for
luxury is already great
Piety is the <means
of> complement[15]
of moral goodness[16]
towards holiness. Therefore, the {R17}question
is not in the relation of one person
to another. We cannot naturally be
saintly and we lost this through original sin, although we certainly can be
morally good.
Is it not enough for
us that we
a person never lies, whether or not he has a secret inclination which, were it
put in the right situation, would develop into lying?
We surely ask whether
a man undertakes his actions of honesty, of fidelity, etc. out of consideration
for a divine obligation, if he does them, although these actions are
condemnable before God insofar as they do not arise through this [consideration]
In order to prove that
the person of nature is corrupt one appeals to the civilized condition. One ought to appeal to the natural.
Actions of justice are
those which, when neglected by another, will naturally move us to hate. Actions of love, when neglected, will be reason no reason for love
of others toward us.
{10, Page
Utility; counterfeit
money[17]
{Lower margin}
Because
the basic
talents basic characteristics
of women are used up in the research of the man [16] and his inclinations and
because they [women] also easily create illusion,[18]
they are made to rule and also to govern everything in nations that have taste
{11, sheet inserted after
There
is a perfect world (the moral) in
accordance with the order of nature, and we ask ourselves about this one to the
same extent that we do about the supernatural.
{R18}The virtuous one
sees the rank of others with indifference, although when it relates to himself,
with consideration
One can either confine
his luxurious impulses or, while maintaining them, discover remedies against
their diseases. To the latter belong
science, and respect for life for the sake of the imminence of death, and
solace for the future